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AFH 1 · Chapter 16 · Section 16.14

Accidents, Deviance, and Consequences

Part of Developing Ideas · 2 sections · ~1097 words · WAPS PFE study material

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Accidents, Deviance, and Consequences — Normal Accident and Normalized Deviance Theories

Foundation

Catastrophic Risk Foundation
Within the USAF, like any other organization, decisions made in highly complex, tightly integrated environments may have unanticipated consequences.

Consequences of Poor Thinking

Poor Thinking Consequences
If Airmen are unaware of, or have failed to think through decisions, catastrophic failure can result.

Normal Accident Theory — Structural Perspective

Normal Accident Theory
The normal accident theory rests upon the assumption that in any highly complex high-risk organizational structure, decision failures are unavoidable.

High-Risk Systems

High-Risk Systems
High-risk systems are systems classified by:
  • Complexity
  • Coupling of multiple processes occurring in conjunction with one another

Vulnerable Systems

Vulnerable Systems
Systems that are interactively complex and tightly coupled are particularly vulnerable to catastrophic failure stemming from:
  • Mistakes made by decision-makers
  • Often small mistakes, which go unrecognized or uncorrected

Coupled System Effects

Coupled System Effects
In coupled (interdependent) systems, tight interactions based on poor decisions can magnify normal accidents into system-wide failure.

Linear vs Nonlinear

Linear vs Nonlinear
In simple linear processes, such as an assembly line, failure has a visible impact on the next process, but is identifiable and limited.
Nonlinear Cascade
When interactions are nonlinear and affect a variety of other systems, the failure of one component has unanticipated effects on many subsystems.

Tightly Coupled Cascade

Tightly Coupled Cascade
If the subsystems are tightly coupled (highly interdependent), a failure quickly causes:
  • Changes in multiple systems nearly simultaneously
  • Making it hard for leaders to diagnose the symptoms and determine the extent of the failure

Global Power Application

Global Power Application
Because Airmen project power globally, anticipation of the impact from even minor deviations from procedure or instruction is extremely challenging.

Normalized Deviance Theory — Behavioral Perspective

Normalized Deviance Theory
The normalized deviance theory is the gradual acceptance of unexpected events and risks as a normal behavior in the operating environment, including the acceptance of lower standards.

How Deviance Becomes Normalized

How Deviance Normalizes
This practice of producing shortcuts or variations to normal procedures eventually becomes normalized to the point where the deviance is no longer noticed.

Deviations as New Norms

Deviations Become Norms
Deviations become accepted as new norms and are no longer assessed using the habits of mind necessary to identify causes and find solutions.

Member Adaptation

Members Adapt
As organizational members become accustomed to the reoccurrence of seemingly minor but unpredicted anomalies, they become less concerned with the potential catastrophic effects of more severe failures of the same system.

Challenger Disaster Example

Challenger Example
A classic case of normalized deviance is the example of the Challenger space shuttle disaster.

O-Ring Erosion

O-Ring Erosion
In this case, the erosion of O-rings was NOT within acceptable tolerances. However, after its occurrence, several times with no catastrophic result, the members of the organization accepted their erosion as a normal and acceptable event, despite deviation from their engineering standards.

NASA Culture

NASA Culture
In this case National Aeronautics and Space Administration, as an organization, was working hard to make space flight feel routine.

Combined Factors

Combined Factors
The organization's culture, combined with:
  • Cognitive bias
  • External pressures

led to the normalization of a potentially catastrophic failure.

Airman Application

Airman Application
Airmen must be aware of the type of organization they operate within and understand its complex interactions. We should:
  • Guard against substandard procedures by continuously questioning the way we do business
  • Consciously identify the "close-calls" and deviances from normal operations
  • Ensure deviations from standards are analyzed as part of the decision-making process to gain an understanding of how to improve programs and implement new decisions

Accidents, Deviance, and Consequences — Practical Drift and Ambiguity

Practical Drift Definition

Practical Drift Definition
Within large organizations, sub-unit leaders at all levels make decisions to maximize efficiency.

Localized Rules

Localized Rules
They establish localized rules and procedures that comply with the overall intent of the organization.

Drift Over Time

Drift Over Time
Over time, these procedures become accepted practice.

Similar to Normalized Deviance

Similar to Normalized Deviance
Similar to normalizing deviance, this practice causes organizational norms to drift.

Often Unproblematic

Often Unproblematic
Often, this drift is unproblematic; however, under ambiguous conditions in complex interactive environments, divergence may lead to:
  • Altered expectations
  • Poor information flow (resulting in catastrophic cross-system failure)

Local Decisions Tie to Goals

Local Decisions Tie to Goals
Airmen must be aware of how their decisions at the local level tie in with overall organizational:
  • Goals
  • Standards
  • Expectations

Leader Awareness Required

Leader Awareness Required
Leaders must use their awareness of organizational goals and standards to:
  • Monitor practical drift in their areas of responsibility
  • Recognize disciplined initiative
  • Maintain standards consistent with outside expectations

Temper Drift

Temper Drift
Airmen in positions of responsibility must work to:
  • Temper practical drift
  • Create a culture where critical thinking is applied to ambiguous threats

Effective Techniques

Effective Techniques
This goal can be accomplished by:
  • Developing processes for identifying and analyzing small problems and failures
  • Treating them as potential indicators of larger problems

Empowerment + Flattening

Empowerment + Flattening
Effective techniques include:
  • Empowerment of front-line workers
  • Flattening hierarchies to reduce information filtering

Four Practical Drift Reduction Methods

4 Drift Reduction Methods
Leaders can further minimize the problems associated with practical drift by:
  1. Creating and encouraging transparency in organizational structures and systems to identify local practical drift and understanding the "why" behind local standards
  2. Avoiding 'Band-Aid®' approaches to small problems by fixing the root cause across the system, as well as creating a climate of candid dialogue to review and revisit standards and seek problems
  3. Monitoring seams where information is handed off between units and organizations
  4. Conducting careful after-action reviews focused on process improvement

Ambiguity

Ambiguity Challenge
The challenge for Airmen of all ranks is that ambiguous threats do not trigger organizational responses.

Recovery Window Narrows

Recovery Window Narrows
The failure to apply critical thinking to ambiguous threats means:

- The recovery window between the emergence of the threat and its occurrence as a catastrophic failure may narrow

Information Filters

Information Filters
Airmen at all levels must be aware that ambiguous threats may go unaddressed due to information filters caused by:
  • Structural complexity
  • Inter-organizational power dynamics

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